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The operating forces of the military services have often been plagued
with overlapping and conflicting instructions from higher commands. The
diverse information needed by various bureaus and the difficulty of coordi-
nating at the Pentagon level sometimes result in requests for identified infor-
mation, but in different formats and time frames. Information systems are
designed for the planners at the top; hence they rarely assist the manager at
the operating level. Thus, the actual fighting forces are forced to continually
collect and report information that is of marginal value to them.
This dichotomy of interests is most acute in the financial area. The
law provides checks on the expenditure of government money by separation
ot responsibility at the top. Each division needs information to satisfy its
legal requirements and issues instructions to the operating forces to provide
the necessary information. These separate lines of authority and require-
ments unfortunately meet at the operating level.
A portion of the financial expenditures of the Navy is examined in this
paper with particular emphasis on the requirements of the operating forces
that actually spend the money. These expenditures are known to Congress as
Operation and Maintenance, Navy, appropriation 171804, subhead . 1911; to
top Navy planners as budget project 01 funds; and to Navy aviation squadrons
as Bravo money. To the American taxpayer, it is $180 million a year

provided primarily to purchase gasoline and oil for use in Navy aircraft.
The problem analyzed in this paper is the result of a top-down
approach to designing financial management information systems which
forces the aviation squadrons to accumulate data and complete forms which
aid only higher command levels. At the same time, each squadron is left on
its own to devise (or not devise) an effective system of managing the money
it is soending. As Robert Anthony stated the problem, three years before he
was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller):
What the system should do is make the operating manager at all
levels ^concerned about- -worried about- -the resources that he uses.
. . .
/An/ internal source of difficulty is the tendency of systems
planners to go at the job backwards. Many efforts start at the Penta-
gon or major command level and are overly concerned with the man-
agement needs at that level. The resulting system is designed more
to meet these needs than the needs of operating executives in the field,
where the money is actually spent. A consequence of the top-down
approach is that it is necessarily piecemeal because the complexities
at the Pentagon level are so great that it is not feasible to take all of
them into account in designing a single system.
Sometime, might it not be interesting to try the opposite approach?
. . . Concentrate on the question: What management tools are really
helpful in planning and controlling the operations of this base /or squad-
ron/? It might just turn out that the information really helpful at base
level provides all the building blocks for information and control needed
at higher levels. '
Vr. Anthony is currently seeking information systems that pro* ide
data that are useful to the lower levels of command in the Department of
Defense, where the nation's defense dollars are actually spent. This report
presents such a system for Navy fleet aviation squadrons. The approach is
Robert N. Anthony, "New Frontiers in Defense Financial Manage-
ment, " The Federal Accountant (June, 1962), pp. 23, 23.

many-sided and involves the following elements:
1. Interviews with key officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, who need cost data to plan and monitor the Navy's Flying
Hour Program, and officials in the Bureau of Naval Weapons, who need
cost data to satisfy legal and budgetary requirements.
2. An analysis of the applicable instructions promulgated by the
2
Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons, the
Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Commander
Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with particular emphasis on the
requirements of the issuing office and the burden placed on the squad-
rons.
3. A questionnaire sent to the material officers of all Navy fleet
aviation squadrons to determine squadron practices and provide a forum
for suggesting changes in funding procedures, squadron financial man-
agement methods, data collection and reporting.
4. The experience of the author as a material officer in an aviation
squadron during 1962 to 1964.
These elements are combined to portray the system as it presently
operates and also to determine the needs of each level of command for infor-
mation. The actions and requirements at the squadron level are examined
2On May 1, 1966, the Bureau of Naval Weapons will become the Naval
Ordnance Systems Command. Functions of the Bureau of Naval Weapons
described in this paper will be performed by the new Air Systems Command.

in detail. From this, an improved system is designed from the squadron
up.





In the retrenchment of the military following World War II, the Navy
•ought to increase the monetary responsibility of its operational commanders.
This led, in 1947, to procedures for direct funding of aircraft gas and oil
expenditures. Previously, these expenses were not charged to an individual
squadron, detailed reports of expenditure were not necessary, and limitations
were not usually placed on the gas and oil expenditures of each squadron.
Someone higher up the chain of command was responsible for the adequacy and
distribution of funds.
With the introduction of direct funding, however, all squadron com-
manders became directly responsible for their gas and oil expenditures.
Limitations were effected by giving a squadron a quarterly allotment; and
detailed accounting and reporting procedures for the allotment were estab-
lished within each squadron. This allotment was called the Bravo allotment
and could be expended only for gas and oil used in aircraft.
Gradually, other items were brought into the squadron commanders'
realm of responsibility by including them under the Bravo allotment. Flight
clothing, radio tubes, consumable office supplies, ball bearings, and other
consumable aircraft parts were added, but the majority of aircraft parts
remained in appropriation purchase accounts and were not directly funded.

In fact, 90 per cent of aircraft parts were never placed in a Bravo category,
and the squadrons still do not have to account for expenditures on these Darts.
Other expenditures were made by the squadrons but charged to differ-
ent specific accounts. This hindered operations as transfers could not be
made from a well-funded account to an account that was running low. This
restriction was particularly evident in Bravo and TAD funds. TAB (tempo-
rary additional duty) money is used for travel and related expenses. When a
squadron deployed or changed duty stations, TAD funds would be expended
while Bravo would not be used as the squadron would not fly during this
period. Unexpended Bravo funds could not be transferred into the TAD
account and financing additional travel was impossible.
This situation was rectified by combining Bravo, Flight TAD, Marine
Aviation Expeditionary Equipment, and Aviation Consolidated Allowance
funds in the single appropriation subhead . 1911. The Navy may now make
trade -off8 among these areas. The intent is that this one fund will provide
the money to fly, maintain, and move aviation squadrons of the Navy and
Marine Corps. It does, with these restrictions:
1. Money is provided for only the first two levels of maintenance
(squadron and station maintenance but not overhaul).
2. Subsistence, capital charges, and shore-based support are
funded separately.
Interview with Mr. G. W. Martin, Programs and Budget Division,
Bureau of Naval Weapons, January 24, 1966.

A parallel development occurred in the organization of squadrons and
their supporting units which affected the allocation and accounting of funds.
Prior to World War II, each squadron performed its own intermediate main-
tenance. This resulted in a great duplication of tools and equipment and, as
the War soon proved, required more trained men than were available. This
problem was solved by the creation of FASRON's, or Fleet Aircraft Service
Squadrons. As the name implies, these squadrons provided maintenance
services to a number of operating squadrons. This changed funding to the
extent the FASRON's purchased parts for the repair work they performed so
some portion of each operating squadron's Bravo allotment was given to the
FASRON.
After the war, FASRON's presented an organizational problem as they
were separate from, but stationed on, air stations. This forced the air sta-
tions to maintain their own shops to work on station aircraft. This involved
duplication and unbenef ic ial competition. In 1959, the FASRON's were com-
bined with the station aircraft maintenance organization to form a station air-
craft maintenance department, or AMD. Most of the maintenance that had
been performed by the FASRON reverted to a squadron responsibility using
AMD shops, equipment, and talent where necessary. Parts were purchased




In 1963, under Department of Defense Directive, the Navy established
three distinct levels of maintenance, as follows:
1. Organizational maintenance -- performed by an operating squad-
ron on a day-to-day basis and not requiring shop facilities. Includes
pre-flight and post -flight inspections, oeriodic minor inspections, and
maintenance work performed in or on the airplane with a minimum of
tools.
2. Intermediate maintenance- -shop-type test and repair performed
at centrally located facilities. This work is accomplished in AMD shops,
principally by squadron personnel temporarily assigned to the station.
3. Depot maintenance - -aircraft overhaul performed at an industrial
facility.
3
This reorganization necessitated a reallocation of Bravo funds from
the squadrons to the AMD for the parts used by AMD in intermediate mainte-
nance work on squadron aircraft. Although information was solicited from
the squadrons to determine the dollar amount that should be diverted from
squadrons to the AMD's, the actual decision was made at the Bureau of Naval
Weapons level on the basis of an experienced guess. Ten million dollars
was switched in Fiscal Year 1964 and this proved to be within 5 per cent of
the subsequent exoenditure for that year.
3
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction
4700. 2A, The Naval Aircraft Maintenance Program , October 2, 1964.

This diversion of funds was formalized in 1965, when:
CNO /Xhief of Naval Operations requested BUWEPS ^Bureau of
Naval Weapons/ to establish a separate budget project under Aircraft
Operations appropriations subheads for funding consumable materials
(Navy Stock Fund or local purchase) used in component repair at the
aircraft intermediate maintenance level. Aircraft operational and
organizational /_squadron/ maintenance expenses are to continue under
existing budget project 01.2. . .
New budget project numbers 50. 2 . . . have been established to
cover intermediate maintenance.
Thus, the Bravo allotment was split into two categories. The air sta-
tions receive budget project 50. 2 money which is expended for consumable
parts used in the aircraft. The squadron continues to receive project 01.2
funds which finance aviation gas and oil, flight clothing, consumable office
supplies, aerial film, liquid oxygen, material and services purchases at
other than Navy activities.
This separation of financial responsibility resulted in a great change
in the material practices of the squadron. Several years ago, all parts were
ordered by the squadron from station or shipboard supply. This entailed a
squadron material office of four to twelve enlisted men to research stock
numbers, type requisitions, maintain records, accomplish follow-ups on
undelivered material, and physically transfer the material from station sup-
ply to the squadron shops. The implementation of three -level maintenance
and separate funding transferred these functions to the station AMD. There






to one enlisted man. This has increased the importance of simplifying Bravo
procedures as additional work cannot be accomplished by other men in the
material office as before, but just increases the workload of the single enlisted
man.
This brief history illustrates the many changes that have occurred in
the maintenance and material areas of aircraft squadron operations. The
changes in specific reports and procedures have been even more frequent




THE SQUADRON IN THE NAVY COMMAND STRUCTURE
The smallest element of Naval Aviation which functions as a unit and
for which costs are maintained is the aircraft squadron. It is small enough
to be easily deployed; large enough to accomplish a significant mission.
Depending on type of aircraft flown, a squadron maintains from 12 to 25
planes. The officer complement is 15 to 50 and the enlisted men number 150
to 300. Most of the officers are pilots, or flight officers, who also supervise
the maintenance work performed by the enlisted men on the aircraft.
Although squadrons are flooded with instructions from higher authority
on procedures and reports, they are left to their own internal management
methods in important areas. The commanding officer is responsible for using
the resources of the squadron to effect training and achieve a high state of
readiness, although the type and quantity of resources he can use is deter-
mined by higher commands. But the decision as to which resources are
most valuable is his. Rationally, the commanding officer needs to determine
the resource (planes, parts, people, money, time) that is the limiting factor
in obtaining readiness (ability to perform the military mission) and maximize
the use of this resource. In reality, changes in operational requirements




The Bravo money that a squadron receives is granted by the Com-
mander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, in the form of an operating
target for each quarter. The amount granted is a compromise between the
squadron's request and the total money available. Legal deficiency respon-
sibility is retained by COMNAVAIRL.ANT but the squadron commanding offi-
cer is vitally concerned with any possible over -expenditure of his operating
target.
In keeping with the squadron -oriented approach, this discussion of
the chain of command has started at the lowest level and will continue up
from the squadron. Figure 1 presents the chain of command and the flow of
Bravo money schematically.
Above the squadron in the administrative chain of command is the
Commander Fleet Air (COMFAIR) and his staff. This staff usually is phys-
ically located at the same air station as the squadron. In the funding and
maintenance areas, the staff is often needed to solve problems arising
between the squadron and the air station. The Commander Fleet Air is also
the Commander Naval Air Bases. This recent combination of duties pro-
vides a commander immediately above the squadron and the air station who
exercises control over both. His staff provides detailed procedures for
funding and maintenance interactions between the aircraft squadron and the
station aircraft maintenance department.
This disc ussion is based on tl e Atlantic Fleet organization. A paral-
lel organization exists in the Pacific. Bravo money is also distributed, by the
Commander Naval Air Training Command, the Commander Naval Air Re-
serve Training, and the Bureau of Naval Weapons.
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Air Force, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet
Prior to May 1, 1966
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Naval Air Bases





Asst. Sec /Nav for
Financial Management
(Comptroller)
Secretary of the Navy







- Air Force, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet
I
After reorganization of May 1, 1966.
indicates Bravo funding authority.
Commander \ Commander
Naval Air Bases \ Fleet Air
I
Naval Air Station Squadron
Fig. 1. --Simplified administrative chain of command
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The Commander Fleet Air is not directly involved in the distribution
of Bravo funds. However, requests for increases or decreases by the squad-
ron are channeled through the COMFAIR and an endorsement or recommenda-
tion is added.
The principal administration of Bravo funds is accomplished by the
Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. This logistic -type com-
mander is responsible for providing trained, equipped aircraft squadrons to
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and his subordinate operational
commanders. In performing this function, COMNAVAIRLANT distributes
Bravo funds to all aircraft squadrons under his command. This is accom-
plished by providing each squadron with a quarterly OPTAR, or operating
target. This distribution is based on projected needs of each squadron to
accomplish training continually and to provide military capabilities when
deployed.
COMNAVAIRLANT maintains final legal responsibility for overexpen-
diture of funds. This places a requirement for close monitoring of funds
expended by the squadrons which is satisfied through the Fleet Aviation
Accounting Office, Atlantic. The FAAOLANT receives a copy of each requisi-
tion which is a charge against the Bravo fund from both the squadron anu the
air station where the material was purchased. By matching these requisitions,
2FAAOLANT provides formal accounting of funds for COMNAVAIRLANT.
Department of the Navy, Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic




Directing all the operating forces of the Navy is the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO). On his staff are officers who plan for the future flying
requirements of the Navy. This includes the determination of Bravo costs
and the monitoring of the Navy Flying Hour Program. CNO directs the
Bureau of Naval Weapons how to allot the Navy's Bravo money. This proce-
dure will be discussed more fully in Chapter III.
The Bureau of Naval Weapons resides in the 'producer*' side of the
3
Navy's bilinear organization. (See Fig. 1.) As a resource manager,
BUWEPS provides the weapons and aircraft required by the operating forces.
BUWEPS also manages the money for these weapon systems, including Bravo
money. The Congressional appropriation 171804, subhead . 1911. is allotted
by BUWEPS to COMNAVAIRLANT and the other commands for distribution to
the aviation squadrons. Funds are allotted directly to air stations to purchase
aircraft parts.
BUWEPS has a requirement for legal documents to account for the
expenditure of funds under its control. The process of obtaining those docu-
ments is discussed in Chapter III. The requirement to maintain the legal
records is prescribed by the Comptroller of the Navy, the Assistant Secre-
tary for Financial Management. The Navy Comptroller Manual prescribes
detailed accounting procedures to maintain records and controls necessary
to satisfy the requirements of the Anti-Deficiency Act.
3
Fred Korth, "The Challenge of Navy Management, * United States
Naval Institute Proceedings (August, 1963), p. 29.
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The Navy Comptroller Manual also provides procedures for accounting
at the C 3MNAVAIRL.ANT and squadron level. These will be included in the
discussion of reporting requirements of the squadron in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF POJLICY AND INSTRUCTIONS
Each aviation squadron receives instructions concerning Bravo
expenditures, records, or reporting from a minimum of six sources: the
Comptroller of the Navy; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Bureau of Naval
Weapons; the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; COMNAVAIRJLANT or
COMNAVAIRPAC; and the local Commander Fleet Air. Other commands,
such as air stations, commanders of carrier air groups, and commanders
of fleet air wings, often publish further instructions on Bravo funds. AH of
these instructions cover the same subject, and there is a great amount of
duplication. Changes are frequent and correcting or revising each of the
instructions is a slow process, so there is generally disagreement among the
various instructions. The first problem of the squadron material officer (who
is responsible for maintaining the Bravo records) is to determine which
instructions to follow and which are out of date.
The basic policies and legal responsibilities of the Navy in accounting
for public funds are expressed in the Navy Comptroller Manual:
In accordance with policy of the Secretary of the Navy that the
accounting effort to be performed by units of the operating forces be
kept to an absolute minimum, consistent with adequate fund control,
The reorganisation of May 1, 1966, will change the Bureau of Supplies




and that fund administration responsibility be placed at the highest pos-
sible level, the type commander has been assigned the responsibility
for fund administration for ships.
Fleet Air Force Commanders are responsible for financial man-
agement of fleet aviation squadrons and units under their administrative
control. This responsibility includes financial planning, administration
of allotted funds, review and analysis of the rate of obligation and expen-
diture, and performance review and reporting. In order to permit dis-
charge of this responsibility, the appropriate fleet aviation accounting
office will maintain the official allotment accounting records. 2
The Navy Comptroller Manual also addresses itself to records on the
squadron level:
A memorandum record of financial transactions, Squadron Opera-
ting Target Record, will be maintained for each squadron optar. The
Squadron Operating Target Record will provide adequate data for local
financial management and for preparing Part 1 of the Aircraft Operating
Cost Report.
*
In this instance the Manual describes a report sent by the squadrons to the
Bureau of Naval Weapons. The Manual also refers to reports between the
squadrons and the Chief of Naval Operations and from the Fleet Aviation
Accounting Offices to the squadrons.
Each squadron is required to maintain a copy of Volume VIII, 'Oper-
ating Forces Funding and Accounting, " of the Naval Comptrollers Manual.
There are many command levels between the Office of the Comptroller and
the squadrons, however, and changes in the Manual lag far behind corre-
sponding changes made by these commands. Thus, the often -out -of-date,
2
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Navy Comptroller
Manual (NAVEXQS P-1000, Vol. 8), para. 081102, 081111.
3
Ibid . , para. 84203. The Aircraft Operating Cost Reoort is no longer
submitted by the squadrons.
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very general, Navy Comptroller Manual offers little aid to the squadron in
managing Bravo funds.
The Bureau of Naval Weapons (BUWEPS) fulfills its legal and budge-
tary responsibilities through the use of transmittals and the Status of Fund
Authorisation, NAVCOMPT Form 2025. The transmittals are prepared by
the aviation squadrons. They include a covering letter with copies of all
requisition documents constituting a charge against the squadron Bravo funds
and a continuous adding machine tape of all the documents showing the total
obligations for the period. These are mailed to the Fleet Aviation Account-
ing Office every fifteen days. The squadron documents are machine matched
with duplicate documents that are sent by the station supply Issuing the
material.
The FAAO's (Atlantic and Pacific) prepare NAVCOMPT 2025 reports
from the accounting data provided by the squadron transmittals. This report
enables BUWEPS to maintain necessary legal appropriation records. It con-
tains only total expenditures, however, and is not a management tool. Cost
information by aircraft model is provided by the Aircraft Operation and Cost
Report (BUWEPS Instruction 7310. 3B) which is prepared quarterly by the
Fleet Aviation Accounting Offices and sent to BUWEPS. It replaces a detailed
report the squadrons submitted before July 1, 1965. This change has greatly
simplified squadron procedures and has shifted the reporting requirement to
the FAAO's where automatic data processing equipment is available.

20
The squadron refers to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual ,
Volume III, to obtain information regarding the use of flight packets for pur-
chase of fuel and material when away from the home base. These charges
are all Bravo charges and the pro* edures are quite detailed, but most squad -
4
rons are not required or authorized to maintain a copy of this Manual.
Therefore, the information is repeated in Squadron Material Officer Hand-
books published by COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) requires cost data that provide
a performance measure. This is reflected in OPNAV Instruction 3710. 30,
Report of Flying Hours. The Instruction requires submission to CNO of a
semimonthly message and a monthly report by the squadron.
The history of the CNO flying hour report indicates the close tie
between Bravo funds and the Navy's flying hour program. It was initiated in
1962 to provide timely information on the flying orogram hours and cost to
answer questions of the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force had flying
information for each ten -day period, so the original Navy instruction required
each aviation squadron to reoort its Bravo expenses and flight hours for each
ten-day period directly to the Chief of Naval Operations.
The report had to be sent by the squadron within twenty-four hours of
the end of each ten-day period. Accurate information was often not available
that soon from the air station supply, or squadron detachments in other
4
Department of the Navy, Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific
Fleet Instruction P4400. 4D, Sq uadron Material Officer's /Supply Officer's
Handbook (June 12, 1964). p. 8.
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locations. The report was costly to the Navy as it involved over 12,000 mes-
sages a year to CNO plus two or three copies of each message to intermediate
commands.
Several modifications have been made to the original instruction.
Presently, only two messages are required a month (titled Flying Hours
Report, OPNAV 3710-2) and the squadrons have two working days to send the
message (four days if the squadron supports detachments). An additional
report has been recently added to squadron requirements, however. The
Flying Hour Cost Report (OPNAV 3710-3) lists the Bravo charges for each
model of aircraft ooerated and is mailed to CNO by the tenth of each month.
For squadrons operating a single model of aircraft, the information on the
OPNAV 3710-3 duplicates the information sent in the OPNAV 3710-2 mes-
sages.
The information derived from the message reports is used at OPNAV
to provide current status on the Navy's flying hour program. A computer
run is made each month and the following information is printed for every
squadron:
Total annual programmed flight hours, Bravo cost, and aircraft
inventory.
Projected flight hours and Bravo cost to date.
Actual flight hours and Bravo cost to date.
Aircraft on board currently and average on board since July I.
Bravo cost per flight hour, actual and projected.
Utility rate (flight hours per aircraft), actual and projected.
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The projections are not simply straight line rates but curves based on past
history and predictions from the major commands. Factors such as deploy-
ments, increased reserve flying in the summer, and aircraft model transi-
tions are included in the programmed predictions to provide a valid base for
5
comparing actual results.
The individual squadron information is summarized by major com-
mand (C OMNAVAIRDANT, COMNAVAIRPAC , Commander Naval Air Training
Command, Commander Naval Air Reserve Training, and BUWEPS activities).
Total flight hours and Bravo expenditures are also compiled for the complete
Navy, thus providing a one -line summary of the current Navy program
position.
Precise cost data associated with the operation of each model of air-
craft are provided by the monthly report 3710-3. This Flying Hour Cost
Report is used with the flight activity data reported through the Aircraft
Accounting System to satisfy the requirement to develop operating cost data.
This additional report is required to provide more exact data than can be pro-
vided in the limited time given the squadrons to send the message report.
The mailed report also contains fewer errors than the message report, which
is sometimes garbled in transmission.
5
Interview with Commander W. W. Morton, Program Analysis
Section, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), November 22,
1965.
6
Department of the Navy, OPNAV Instruction 3710. 30, Report of
Flying Hours (June 2, 1965), p. 1.
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The duplication of instructions concerning Bravo funds is indicated
by a comparison of the references used in the Fleet Aviation Financial Regu-
lations issued by the Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and
the references in Aviation Unit Financial Regulations published by the Com-
mander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Although addressed to the
same types of aviation squadrons and issued at the same time for the same
purpose, the instructions list quite different references:
COMNAVAIRLANT
(a) NAVCOMPT Manual, Vol. II
(b) NAVCOMPT Manual, Vol. HI
(c) COMNAVAIRLANTINST 4235. 7
(d) NAVCOMPT Manual, Vol. VIII
(e) BUWEPSINST 7303.9
(f) BUSANDAINST 4020. 5
(g) OPNAVINST 3710. 3 7
COMNAVAIRPAC
(a) NAVCOMPT Manual, Vol. II
(b) BUSANDA Manual. Vol. HI
(c) OPNAVINST 3710. 6C
(d) BUWEPSINST 7820. ID
(e) NAVCOMPT Manual, Vol. VIII
(f) OPNAVINST 3710.29
(g) OPNAVINST P5442. 21
(h) BUWEPINST 04700. 3
(i) BUWEPINST 4700. 2A
(j ) BUWEPINST 7820. 5
(k) COMNAVAIRPAC INST PI 320. IF
(1) BUWEPSINST 7820. 4
(m) COMNAVAIRPACINST 7820. 1A8
Only the Navy Comptroller Manual and OPNAVINST 3710. 30 are referenced
by both instructions (OPNAVINST 3710. 30 is a recent revision of OPNAVINST
3710. 29). This lack of agreement is indicative of the redundancy of the
instructions available. Most of these instructions are also available to the
squadrons and they must each make a similar choice of which to follow and
'COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 7310. II, op. clt.
, p. 1.
g
Department of the Navy, COMNAVAIRPAC Instruction 7303. I IB,
Aviation Unit Financial Regulations (June 4, 1965), p. I.
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which to ignore. A problem is caused by a failure of all issuing commands to
update duplicating instructions when changes occur. Instructions are usually
consistent when initially issued.
The actual COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC instructions are
not as different as their respective references would indicate. They provide
to the fleet aviation squadrons the detailed accounting information, financial
regulations, and reporting procedures contained in the NAVCOMPT, OPNAV,
BUWEPS, and BUSANDA Instructions.
The instructions are too long to describe in detail but both contain
background information on appropriations, subheads, bureau control numbers,
bureau project numbers, operating targets, functional account numbers, fund
codes, and purchase requests. They contain identical lists of financial respon
sibility and the same general accounting instructions. Under Budget Project
01 (Bravo), Aircraft Operating Funds, specific funding, record and file keep-
ing, and reporting procedures are delineated.
The principal difference in the administration of funds is that
COMNAVAIRPAC allows the squadrons to carry forward unexpended funds
from quarter to quarter while COMNAVAIRJLANT requires squadrons to return
excess funds at the end of each quarter. Under this latter procedure the
squadrons must spend all the funds granted or lose the money.
Throughout the two instructions the emphasis is on accounting for funds
after they have been spent and reporting these expenditures to higher author-
ity. No procedures are prescribed for internal reporting of Bravo fund status.
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No indication is given of how the required reports can aid squadron financial
management. The only mention of fund management other than not over-
spending the squadron operating target is the responsibility for "the effective
9
and economical utilization of funds and material.
These instructions provide information to the squadrons concerning
Bravo accounting and reporting. But instructions often mean one thing to the
writer and another to the reader. The next chapter examines the actions
taken in the squadrons based on their interpretation of the instructions exam-
ined in this chapter.
9COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 7310. II, op. cit .
. p. II- 1, and
COMNAVAIRPAC Instruction 7303. IB. op. cit .




In order to design an improved system for managing Bravo funds at
the squadron level, it was necessary to determine the practices and attitudes
existing in aviation squadrons. This objective was fulfilled by mailing ques-
tionnaires to the material officers of all 209 Navy aviation squadrons in the
Pacific and Atlantic Fleets.
The questionnaire (Appendix A) was formulated in three principal
areas of interest:
- Internal Bravo fund reporting
- Squadron interest in Bravo exoenditures
- Forms used for internal reporting.
Twenty questions were multiple choice for ease of replying. The final ques-
tion was open-end and provided a forum for suggestions, complaints, or
changes desired in the present system. The material officers were also
requested to enclose copies of any forms used for internal reporting of Bravo
fund status.
The questionnaire was reviewed by the Head, Program Analysis Sec-
tion, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). No provision was




made for identification of the squadrons responding, and the letter of trans-
mittal assured anonymity to the material officers. This was considered
necessary to obtain objectivity as some questions reflected the attitude of the
commanding officer and other officers in the squadron.
Because of the nature of some questions, the questionnaire was mailed
directly to the material officers rather than to the commanding officers, as
is standard Navy practice. In most squadrons the material officer is a
Lieutenant or Lieutenant (Junior Grade) midway through his first three -year
tour in the squadron following completion of flight training. His knowledge of
material practices is gained from working with the former material officer
for several months and reading the various instructions. At most bases a
provision is made to meet periodically with base supply personnel to solve
problems and to discuss new procedures. Working under the material officer
is usually an assistant grooming for the job and one enlisted aviation store-
keeper with five to ten years' experience. The aviation storekeeper usually
maintains all the records as the material officer is primarily a pilot or avia-
tion observer and is not in the office most of the time. Figure 2 shows the
oosition of the material officer in the squadron organization.
One hundred and twenty-three questionnaires were returned and tabu-
lated. Comments on many questionnaires indicated that they were completed
by the material officers rather than by the assistants or aviation storekeep-
ers. The officers gave indication of being interested in the survey, and over


























Note: The Material and Quality Control Officers are staff assistants to the
Maintenance Officer.
Fig. 2. --Simplified squadron organization
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Before an examination of the results of the individual questions, a few
general observations are possible. Despite some desired changes, almost all
respondents were satisfied with the present Bravo accounting and reporting
system. Many comments stressed the improvement of the present system
over the procedures in effect before July, 1965. The great reduction in avia-
tion storekeepers under the current system engendered a few complaints plus
a realization that the system must be simple with only one storekeeper in
each squadron. In specific squadron procedures, variation is the key word,
although some patterns are obvious in the data. These will be indicated as the
information is presented. It should be noted that not all questions were
answered by every respondent, with the result that totals varied for the dif-
ferent questions.
Internal Bravo Fund Reporting
A money-time graph has been a traditional method of visually present-
ing the Bravo fund status, although it is not required by any current instruc-
tions. The graph is usually drawn on a large sheet of plexiglass and hung on
the wall. A typical money -time graph is presented in Figure 3.
The first question in the questionnaire asked if a money-time graph
was maintained in the material office or in the commanding officer's office.
The answers were:
Per Cent Number
50 62 maintained graph in material office
54 66 maintained graph in commanding officer's office
29 36 maintained graph in both offices














Planned operating target balance
Actual operating target balance
, 15
September
Fig. 3. --Money-time graph
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All respondents answered this question. The money-time graph appears to
be a prevailing financial tool with 92 squadrons, or 75 per cent, indicating
they maintain a graph.
The value of maintaining a money-time graph in both the material and
commanding officer offices is open to question. The graph provides a quick
approximation of the squadron financial position and is most valuable to the
commanding officer. The material officer, however, should be aware of the
exact status of the Bravo fund. This information is provided by a detailed
form.
The second question pertained to the use of a detailed form to report
internally the Bravo status. Such a form is not specified and most are
mimeographed forms that the individual squadrons have developed.
Per Cent Number
70 86 used a detailed form
28 34 did not use a detailed form
2 3 no response
Some officers indicated that they used a typed memorandum to convey the
information. Fifty-one forms were received from squadrons and representa-
tive copies are included in Appendix B.
Analysis indicates that 90 per cent of the squadrons either maintained
a money -time graph or used a detailed form for internal reporting. Over
half of the squadrons used both methods.





53 65 updated semi-monthly (when the OPNAV
3710-2 is prepared)
19 24 updated weekly
14 17 updated daily (5 additional squadrons updated
daily near the end of the quarter)
6 7 updated monthly
3 10 no response.
Two questions pertained to the cost -per -hour computation. This is
a convenient method of determining performance. The Bravo money obli-
gated is divided by the hours flown during the same period to determine a
Bravo cost -per -flight hour. This is usually fairly constant for long periods
and among squadrons flying the same type of aircraft on the same missions.
The frequency of informing the commanding officer of the current cost per
hour was:
Per Cent Number
reported cost per hour semi-monthly
reported cost per hour weekly
reported cost per hour daily
reported cost per hour monthly
reported cost per hour quarterly
did not report cost per hour
no resnonse.
Additionally, the squadrons were asked if the cost-per-hour computa-
tion was further broken down into avgas, avlube, and other costs. The
results:
Per Cent Number
64 79 did not compute the individual costs per hour
34 42 did compute the cost per hour of avgas,
avlube, and other expenses










Question 5 requested if the Bravo money remaining was expressed in
dolLars, flight hours, or both. The intent of this question was to determine
the extent the squadrons translate bulk information into something usable at
the squadron level. The author believes it is not as useful for a commanding
officer to know he has $100, 000 left as it is to know he can fly 2, 000 more
flight hours. However, a third of the material officers did not convert dollar
amounts into flight hours. The answers:
Per Cent Number
62 77 expressed the money remaining in both
dollars and flight hours
36 44 expressed the money remaining in dollars
only
2 2 expressed the money remaining in flight
hours only.
To determine the relationship of internal and external reporting, the
material officers were asked whether internal reports to the commanding
officer were related to external reoorts.
Per Cent Number
78 96 considered the external and internal reports
related.
15 18 considered their internal reports unrelated to
external reports
7 9 no response.
Two questions in the first section determined the attitude of the
squadrons concerning the proper fund balance to plan for at the end of each
quarter and at the end of the fiscal year. It is vital that the squadron not
over -expend its allotment, especially at the end of the fiscal year. But it
is difficult to be assured of accounting for all the money as flight packets
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are issued to plane crews throughout the year. These contain stubs which
are blank checks on the squadron's account. Sometimes these stubs are
misplaced by flight crews and the material officer does not know how much
money has been spent. Furthermore, many squadrons feel they need to
have a sum of money to spend on fuel for any special commitments they
receive at the end of the quarter or year.
Balanced against these reasons to maintain a slight buffer at the end
of the period is the desire to spend all the money the squadron is given.
This is a combination of a desire to accomplish the most training possible
and a fear that if the squadron does not spend the money this year they will
not get as much next year. This fear is not justified and can lead to squan-
dering money just to spend it. The fear is nurtured, however, by the yearly
messages of the major commands which caution the squadrons that money
not spent at the end of the fiscal year is lost to the Navy. The questionnaire









plan for a balance of zero
plan for a balance around $100
plan for a balance around $200
plan for a balance around $500
plan for a greater balance ($1, 000, $2, 000, 10%)
no response.
There was an observable difference between Pacific squadrons, who keep
the money remaining at the end of the quarter, and Atlantic squadrons, who









in subsequent quarters. Many Pacific squadrons do not make an effort to
spend the money at the end of the quarter as they know they will have it to
spend in later quarters.
The second question concerned the money remaining at the end of the
fiscal year. The squadron practices are:
Per Cent Number
plan for a balance of zero
plan for a balance around $100
plan for a balance around $200
plan for a balance around $500
plan for a greater balance ($1, 000, $2, 000)
no response.
Twenty-nine respondents did not answer either question. This may indicate
that many squadrons do not plan for a specified balance. Some indicated
that they did not have a goal but spent what they needed to accomplish their
training or they really had no control over expenditures. This latter was
indicated to be true of shipboard operations where the squadrons flew when
they were told to fly and had little control over the rate or amount of expen-
ditures.
The last question in the first section inquired if the squadrons were
using an illegal device. This is the practice of obligating money 'on the
books without actually typing a stub and purchasing something. This pro-
cedure is a way of keeping money in the squadron at the end of the quarter
instead of returning it to COMNAVAIRLANT. Many respondents pointed out
that this was prohibited by the Bravo instructions.
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The question was directed only to the squadrons that strive for a zero
balance at the end of the quarter. Of those squadrons:
62 type stubs
10 do not type stubs.
Several squadrons who do use this device guiltily claimed they don't juggle
the books. "
Squadron Interest in Bravo Expenditures
An attempt to assess the attitude of the squadron resulted in four ques
tions in this section. The material officers were first asked to indicate the
number of times the subject of reduced aircraft operating costs had been
mentioned in all officers' meetings the past year. Ail officers' meetings are
held in the squadrons once or twice a week and provide a forum to present
new information or to discuss topics of interest. They are the ideal and
principal forum for the commanding officer or other officers to discuss re-











never mentioned reduced costs during the year
mentioned reduced costs twice in a year
mentioned reduced costs four times
mentioned reduced costs six times
mentioned reduced costs ten times
mentioned reduced costs fifteen times
mentioned reduced costs over fifteen times
no response.
Of the squadrons answering this question, 30 per cent never discussed




A companion, but more direct, question asked the material officers
to describe their commanding officers' interest in Bravo expenditures. The
results:
Per Cent Number
7 3 described interest as slight
37 46 described interest as moderate
52 64 described interest as great
4 5 no response.
An analysis of these two questions indicates that the material officers were
loathe to describe the interest of their commanding officer as moderate or
slight, although the answer to the first question indicated it was not great.
Thirteen of the responses that described the interest of the commanding
officer in Bravo expenditures as great also indicated the subject of cost
reduction had never been mentioned in an officers' meetings during the past
year.
A third question to determine squadron interest in Bravo expenditures
was asked in the first section of the questionnaire. It requested if the com-
manding officer required a breakdown of the miscellaneous costs into flight
clothing, hand tools, office supplies. The answers were:
Per Cent Number
34 42 did require a breakdown
64 79 did not require a breakdown
2 2 no response.
The majority of the commanding officers did not desire to know what the
Bravo money was spent for. Several material officers indicated that they
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keep these records for their own information. The others apparently do not
determine the specific items for which Bravo money is spent. This could be
interpreted as less than a great interest by the commanding officer in Bravo
expenditures.
The identity of the squadron officers who mentioned reduced costs in
all officers' meetings was obtained. In the 73 squadrons where reduced costs
were discussed, the following officers participated:
43 commanding officers spoke an average of three times a year
on cost reduction
13 executive officers spoke an average of three times
18 operations officers spoke an average of two times
29 maintenance officers spoke an average of three times
52 material officers spoke an average of four times.
Several interesting patterns emerge. Executive officers, who are groomed
to take over the commanding officer billet after a year, spoke on cost reduc-
tion less than half as often as the commanding officers. The need for econ-
omy does not seem to be of concern until they occupy the number-one position
in the squadron. On the other hand, the operations officers, who are the
third senior officer but not in the chain of command between the commanding
and material officers (see Fig. 1), spoke on reduced costs as often as the
executive officers. The material officers spoke most often on reduced costs,
and this is their responsibility.
Forms Used for Internal Reporting
The key question in this section asked the material officers to indi-
cate the principal methods used to inform their commanding officers of Bravo
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expenditures and balance. They were asked to rank all the methods employed
in order of importance. The results were:
Total
Number Ranking Method
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
Money-time graph O ft •»•> •s 1 6
15
15































Figure 4 presents the information graphically. A clear pattern emerges.
Squadrons which use an internal squadron form rate it the principal vehicle
for informing the commanding officer. The money -time graph was rated
first by most squadrons that did not use a squadron form and second by those
that did use such a form.
The OP-501 is an external report that all squadrons submit. Most
squadrons considered it the third most useful method of informing the com-
manding officer although it contains no details. The semi-monthly trans-
mittals of requisitions give the commanding officer an opportunity to examine
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Fig. 4. --Ranking of methods for presenting Bravo information
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The correctness of this question was affected by recent changes in
instructions which changed several reports. The OP- 501 is currently called
OPNAV 3710-2, although most squadrons appeared to be familiar with the
OP-501 designation. A new report, OPNAV 3710-3, has been added. It is
a monthly report, however, and would be of little additional use in keeping
the commanding officer informed as it duplicates the information in the
semi-monthly 3710-2. These changes would certainly not alter the first two
choices and probably would not affect the third or fourth. The ratings are
therefore considered an accurate reflection of the current squadron use and
opinion of these various means of informing the commanding officer of the
Bravo expenditures and balance.
The next question explained the tabulation of the OP-501 report at the
Pentagon and asked if the material officer felt 'it would be worth the time
and effort to send each squadron the information concerning its progress. rt
Per Cent Number
65 30 desired the information
26 32 did not feel the benefit would be worth the cost
9 11 no response.
The squadrons were also asked if they would like to have progress and cost-
per-hour information on sister squadrons (squadrons flying the same type
aircraft).
Per Cent Number
67 32 desired this information on sister squadrons
25 31 did not desire the information
8 10 no response.
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Several replies Indicated that they computed this information for their own
squadron and made an effort to obtain the information (especially cost per
hour) of other squadrons on the same base or shir>.
The final question requested additional or better information that the
squadron would like if the Bravo record -keeping and reporting system was
changed. This was an open-end question, but the replies can be grouped in
three categories:
Per Cent Number
34 42 stated that they desired no changes
29 36 listed desired changes
37 45 made no comments in answer to the question.
Although the question requested changes "to aid you in managing Bravo funds, "
the majority of the suggestions were designed to ease the reporting task of
the squadrons. The material officers were not as concerned about an
improved method of managing Bravo funds at the squadron level as they were
interested in reducing the number of reports they must make.
The specific suggestions for changes will be discussed and analyzed
in Chapters V and VI. A composite picture of the average squadron can be
delineated, however, and will be of use in later discussion of these proposed
changes. The percentage of squadrons actually represented is shown in
parentheses. The average squadron:
Maintains a money -time graph (75%)
Uses a detailed squadron form for internal reporting (70%)
Updates the graph or form and reports the cost per
hour semi-monthly (53%)
Does not compute separately the cost per hour of avgas,
avlube, and other expenses (64%)
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Expresses the money remaining in both dollars and
flight hours (62%)
Plans for a zero OPTAR balance at the end of the
quarter (39%) and year (45%)
Discusses reduced aircraft operating costs in an
officers' meeting less than five times a year (55%)
Use3 methods for internal reporting of Bravo funds
in the following order of importance:
1. Squadron form (developed by the individual
squadron) (7 3%)
2. Money-time graph (maintained as the
squadron desires) (65%)
3. OP-501 Report (currently entitled OPNAV
3710-2) (71%)
4. Transmittals to Fleet Aviation Accounting
Office (61%)
5. OPTAR records (46%).
Desires to have the information computed from the
OP-501 report concerning squadrons flying the same
aircraft (67%)




IMPROVEMENTS TO PRESENT PROCEDURES
Several changes can be made in the current Bravo reporting system
to improve effectiveness at small cost. These are in the areas of internal
reporting procedures, operating targets, transmittals, and reports. At this
point no arguments will be made to change the squadron accounting and
record -keeping system. It has undergone many changes, including a major
improvement in July, 1965. The inputs are easily obtained and the system
is simple and adequate.
Internal reporting procedures can be improved, however. The prac-
tices in the squadrons are extremely varied and some are clearly inadequate
for effective financial management. The methods outlined here will be most
useful for land -based operations under conditions where the squadron com-
manding officer has more control over the squadron flight operations and the
Bravo expenditures. They will, however, be useful information systems
even under conditions where the commanding officer has little control over
expenditures.
Money -Time Graph
The principal reporting and control system recommended is a money
-
time graph. This method provides an easy -to -maintain, visual display of




information the chart provides a quick indication of squadron operations for
the squadron commanding officer or operations officer. A suggested chart
is shown in Figure 5 and explained below.
The time period covered in the chart is a quarter as the operating
target is granted for a quarter's operations. The planned flight hours are
indicated by a black line running from zero at the start of the quarter on the
left up to the total planned hours on the right. This can be a straight line or
be more refined if special operations are planned. In either case, it should
realistically portray the expected operations for the quarter.
This same line serves as the Bravo cost line by multiplying the flight
hours by a standard cost -per -flight hour. This cost per hour can. be the
fleet-wide standard for the type of aircraft or the squadron standard from
previous quarters. The standard cost should be adjusted for gas and oil
price changes and any other expected variations so that it will be the closest
possible approximation of actual costs. By multiplying the flight hours on
the right side of the chart by the standard cost per hour, the dollar value
corresponding to the flight hours is obtained and entered to the right of the
flight hours.
The total operating target is indicated by drawing a red line at the
dollar value of the money granted. If the squadron received less funds than




Bravo Fund and Flight Hour Status
Key:
Planned hours and Bravo expenditures
Actual hours flown
— Actual Bravo expenditures















Fig. 5. --Money-time and flight hour graph (mid-quarter)
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During the quarter the operations department plots the hours flown in
blue. This can be done semi-monthly, weekly, or daily, according to squad-
ron preference. The money expended is plotted in red semi-monthly when
the document transmittal and OPNAV 3710-2 are sent. If the squadron is
operating at the standard cost per hour, both lines will be the same. A
higher -than-projected cost per hour is indicated by a money line above the
flight hours line and vice versa. A blue line above the black line indicates
flying more hours per day than planned.
Figure 6 is a money-time and flight hours graph at the end of the
quarter. The squadron has experienced a higher -than -projected cost per
hour and the planned flight hours have increased. This necessitated a request
for additional Bravo funds. The granting of these funds (illustrated on
September 10) is indicated by drawing a new total operating target line in
red and running a new planning line from September 10 and the current
expenditure line to the end of the quarter and the new operating target level.
The money-time graph provides the commanding officer with a simple
alert signal as he can easily determine if the current rate of flying and Bravo
expenditure will exceed the operating target for the quarter. The operations,
scheduling, training and other concerned officers can understand and use the
information on the graph but they usually do not learn to understand or use
the information on a written report. Maintaining a graph in the material
office is probably not necessary as few officers see it and the material
officer should be familiar with the current status as indicated more accurately
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Fig. 6. --Money-time and flight hour graph (end of quarter)
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on an internal reoort of Bravo expenditures.
Other information could be included on the graph, such as the Bravo
expenditures in previous quarters of the fiscal year, standard cost per hour,
running cost per hour, and gallons per hour rate of fuel usage. Most of these
items more properly belong on a separate internal report.
Internal Reporting Form
Fifty-one different forms for reporting Bravo expenditures were
returned by the squadrons responding to the questionnaire. The best features
of these were combined to produce the form depicted on the succeeding page.
This financial summary provides all the information required for external
reports and presents detailed information in a format designed for manage-
ment decisions.
The form is divided into 15 -day reporting period, current quarter, an
fiscal year sections. The 15-day reporting period section presents informa-
tion corresponding to the transmittal of documents and the sending of the
OPNAV 3710-2 message after the fifteenth and end of each month. This is the
control period and space is provided to show avgas and avoil costs and other
expenditures separately for two models of aircraft. This could be expanded
to accommodate more models of aircraft or be reduced for squadrons oper-
ating only one model. The gallons of avgas and avoil consumed per flight





Status as of 2400
Fifteen -Ray Reporting Period Status
A. Obligations this reoorting period:
(Aircraft Model) (Aircraft Model)
1. Avgas and Avoil $ $
I. Other expenditures $ $
3. Total period obligations $ $
B. Proposed flight hours this month
.•—«—_—. njr* hre
C. Flight hours flown I- 15 hrs hrs
D. Flight hours flown 16 -end hrs hrs
E. Number of operating aircraft at end of period:
,
Current Quarter Statue
F. OPTAR funds available quarter $ hrs
- iM IlllllW——III m * ill 'IMIIWI PHII—— III VMMMMHMM.
G. Actual obligations and flight hours to date $ hrs
H. OPTAR and flight hours remaining CF«G) $ hrs
I . Cost per hour (G obligations * G hours) $
J. Hours available (H OPTAR remaining I) hrs
Fiscal Year Status
K. Annual Planning Figure and flight hours $ hrs
Is, Actual obligations and flight hours to date $ hrs
M. Annual Planning Figure and hours
remaining (K-L) $ hrs
N. Cost per hour (L obligations 4 1* hours) $






Maintenance Officer Material Officer
Material File
Fig. 7. --Squadron Financial Summary Report
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Line B is the proposed flight hours for the month, and space is pro-
vided to show the planned hours for each model of aircraft. The hours flown
during the first fifteen days is indicated on line C and the hours flown during
the remainder of the month on line D. This provides a comparison of the
olanned flight hours with the hours actually flown and also provides the infor-
mation necessary for the OPNAV 3719-2 report. No provision is made for
computing cost per hour in this section as it varies widely over a period as
short as fifteen days and is not an accurate indicator. Any unusual expendi-
tures would show up under 'Other expenditures ' (line A -2).
The current quarter section provides information on expenditure of
the operating target (GPTAR) which is granted for the quarter's operations*
Line F shows the total funds granted and the hours this will provide at the
standard cost per hour (the average for all squadrons operating that model
of aircraft). Line G is the money actually spent and the hours flown from the
beginning of the quarter to 2400 (midnight) of the current reporting period.
By subtracting the dollars in line G from line F, the operating target remain-
ing is shown on line H. Subtracting the hours flown (line G) from the hours
programmed (line F) leaves the hours remaining in the squadron flight pro-
gram (line H). Dividing the obligations on line G by the flight hours on that
line gives the cost per hour which is entered on line I. Dividing this cost per
hour into the operating target remaining shows the hours available with the
money remaining at the current cost per hour (line J).

52
The analysis of the hours in lines H and J is particularly useful in
deciding to request more money for the quarter and how much to request.
Line H is the hours remaining in the planned flight program and line J the
hours the squadrons can fly with the money it has. The difference is the
additional hours the squadron needs to fund and the money required is deter-
mined by multiplying the additional hours by the cost per hour of line I.
Changes in the flying program are also easily handled. At any time the oper-
ations or commanding officer determines a revised program the money re-
quired can be obtained by subtracting the hours in line J from the hours the
squadron needs to fly between the date of the report and the end of the quar-
ter, and multiplying the difference by the cost per hour on line I. In essence,
line J indicates the hours that can be flown with the money that is left for the
quarter. Any additional hours can be flown at the cost per hour shown in
line I.
Fiscal year status gives the position of the squadron in relation to its
planned flight hours for the year and its Annual Planning Figure (this is a
term used by COMNAVAIRPAC to indicate the total Bravo money that the
squadron can expect to receive during the year). Line K shows the Annual
Planning Figure and the programmed hours. Line L indicates the money
spent and the hours flown. The difference shows the money and hours remain-
ing and the cost per hour and hours available are computed as they were in
the current quarter section. In this case the cost oer hour will be for the
entire fiscal year to date instead of just the quarter.
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Most squadrons do not presently show fiscal year status on internal
reoorts, but it is considered valuable for three reasons. First, the obliga-
tions for the year (line L) are required for the semi-monthly OPNAV 3710-2
message. Secondly, the yearly cost per hour is a meaningful figure and pro-
vides a comparison for the current quarter cost per hour. Thirdly, it is
useful for the squadron to view the entire fiscal year program, and have a
method of measuring results with plans.
This form is a suggested format; squadrons with special needs will
want to modify it as necessary. It can be expanded to include information
on detachments or special orojects. Some commanding officers may desire
more information; some less. The important idea is that a comorehensive
format be used to convey useful financial information to the person who is
making the decisions.
Although designed to be used semi-monthly, concurrent with the send-
ing of the transmittal and OPNAV 3710-2, the internal form could be used
only at the end of the month. Its utility is enhanced when used regularly to
provide an indication of trends from one reporting period to the next. This
is particularly applicable to the running cost per hour for the quarter and
fiscal year. Trends can easily be discerned by comparing the figures on cur-
rent and previous reports.
Operating Targets
Several changes by COMNAVAIRLANT and C3MNAVAIRPAC would
Improve Bravo procedures at the squadron level. The questionnaire replies
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indicated that COMNAVAIRPAC's procedure of allowing squadron operating
target balances at the end of a quarter to carry forward automatically into
the next quarter, within the fiscal year, had ended a great deal of unnecessary
expenditures at the end of the quarter to avoid losing squadron Bravo money.
It is recommended that COMNAVAIRLANT adoot this procedure to encourage
thriftier squadron use of funds.
Operating targets are often not granted to the squadrons until late in
the quarter, especially in the first quarter when the Navy approoriations have
not been approved by Congress before the fiscal year begins. At the squadron
level this means that Bravo records must be kept in negative figures. More
important than this minor inconvenience, however, is the fact that the squad-
rons cannot ask for additional funds as they do not know what their original
grant is. In some cases, especially in accelerated flying programs in South-
east Asia, the squadrons have already overexpended their operating target
when it is finally granted late in the quarter.
There are logical reasons for not granting operating targets when
COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC do not have the money to distribute.
But the squadrons are flying and spending money regardless, so it seems
academic not to give them the operating target. With the money granted, the
squadrons could plan better, make requests for additional money when neces-
sary, and avoid negative bookkeeping. Perhaps the grant could be originally
made for 90 per cent of the money expected and adjusted when the Bureau of
Naval Weapons actually allots the money to COMNAVAIRLANT and
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COMNAVAIRPAC. Not giving the operating targets to the squadrons just
compounds the problem of late allotments.
Transmittals
Several small changes by the Fleet Aviation Accounting Offices of the
Pacific and Atlantic fleets would aid the squadrons. First, the current prac-
tice of including credit documents (representing money returned to the squad-
ron for materials that the squadron returns) as minus amounts on the contin-
uous adding machine tape of documents being transmitted sometimes leads to
errors in the squadron. Several comments on the questionnaires indicated a
source of mistakes could be limited by listing credits separately. Perhaps an
ideal solution would be to instruct the squadrons to list all the debit documents
(charges against the squadron Bravo), take a subtotal, and then subtract the
credit documents and show the total on the same tape. This would list the
credits separately and still provide a continuous tape.
A second recommendation would eliminate sending to the squadrons
unmatched expenditures (documents from supply that cannot be matched with
squadron documents) for small amounts. The value of the time spent in trac-
ing documents is often much greater than the dollar amounts of the unmatched
expenditures. If legal and other requirements allow, it might be more
economical for COMNAVAIRL.ANT and COMNAVAIRPAC to absorb these
charges.
At the OPNAV level, there is duplication in the information squadrons
submit in the OPNAV 3710-2 and 3710-3 reports. Currently, the
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OPNAV 3710-2 is a message report sent after the fifteenth and end of each
month and the OPNAV 3710-3 is mailed at the end of the month. For squad-
rons operating only one series of aircraft (a single expenditure account num-
ber) the information in the 37 10-3 is the sum of the two 3710-2 messages.
The reports represent some duplicate reporting for all squadrons. One of
the duplicate reports should be eliminated, although they both have certain
advantages.
The message report (3710-2) is quicker (and more expensive), con-
tains additional information on operating aircraft (A-status aircraft on board),
but contains more errors. The mailed report (3710-3) is more accurate and
presents cost data by model of aircraft. Perhaps the eventual solution
(beyond the elimination of the 3710-3 for squadrons operating only one model
of aircraft) is to transmit the cost data over the same data system now used
to collect aircraft flight information and eliminate both reports.
The final change which is still in the minor category concerns the
information included in instructions on Bravo accounting and reporting. The
great amount of duplication in the instructions issued by NAVCOMPT,
BUWEPS, OPNAV, and COMNAVAIRLANT or COMNAVAIRPAC requires a
series of revisions every time one element changes. This is particularly
true of the Navy Comptroller Manual , which contains detailed discussions of
squadron OPTAR records, BUWEPS reporting procedures, OPNAV require-
ments, and Fleet Aviation Accounting Office procedures which are currently
out of date. Duplication and needless revising could be eliminated if each
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instruction included only the information needed to accomplish a specific
purpose and did not repeat information in other instructions.
Failing this, the squadrons should be relieved of the problems of
duplication by requiring them to maintain only one or two instructions that
contain all required information. The Financial Regulation Instructions pub-
lished by COMNAVAIRPAC and COMNAVAIRLANT are designed to accomplish
this and could be expanded so that they contain all the information the squad-
ron needs. Duplication and differences in instructions would still exist, but
the operating forces would not be involved as they could rely on the Financial
Regulations to reflect the current correct procedures.
In summary, the minor changes suggested are:
Squadron:
Maintain a standard money-time and flight hours graph.
Adopt a comprehensive form for internal financial management.
COMNAVAIRI^ANT and COMNAVAIRPAC:
Automatically carry over squadron operating target balances
from quarter to quarter within the fiscal year.
Grant operating targets to squadrons before start of quarter
even if money is not allotted from the Bureau of Naval
Weapons.
Separate credit documents on transmittal tapes.
Investigate cost -effectiveness of requiring squadrons to
reconcile small dollar unmatched expenditures.
Office of Chief of Naval Operations :
Eliminate duplication of 3710-2 and 3710-3 reports for
squadrons operating one model of aircraft.
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Navy Comptroller and others:
Avoid duplication of constantly changing information in
writing instructions by not repeating items covered
in other instructions.
This chapter has suggested improvements to the current Bravo pro-
cedures. The following chapter will discuss major changes and present the
elements of a system to determine the total cost of squadron operations.

CHAPTER VI
AN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The most obvious, and the most important, change in Bravo proce-
dures is to terminate Bravo allotments and cease holding squadrons account-
able for the money they spend for gas and oil. This idea has many advocates
and a great deal of merit. The granting of Bravo allotments to squadron com-
manders violates the concept of authority commensurate with accountability.
A squadron commanding officer, especially aboard a carrier, does not have
the authority to decide when his squadron will fly, or what type of mission
will be flown, or even what the fuel load will be. No commanding officer can
decide what type of plane his squadron will fly, or what missions he will train
for. In short, a commanding officer can control neither the rate nor the
amount of squadron Bravo expenditures.
This overstates the case as there is variation in the control of Bravo
expenditures depending on the type of squadron. It is estimated that a com-
manding officer of a fighter or attack squadron embarked in a carrier can
control less than 10 per cent of his Bravo expenses (mainly office supplies
and flight clothing as he has little control over flying). However, a command-
ing officer of a patrol squadron can control an estimated 20 per cent or more





of his Bravo expenses. The pace of flying can be varied somewhat at his
discretion (most of patrol squadron flying is training which the commanding
officer can schedule as he desires). Patrol aircraft engines can also be regu-
lated for more efficient fuel consumption if the pilots are so motivated. This
basic difference among types of squadrons must be considered when designing
control systems. It is convenient to consider all Navy aviation squadrons as
one group, but not always valid.
Current Bravo allotment procedures violate another vital concept: the
idea that dollar management is an excellent method oi control until one is
being shot at; then one is on a non-dollar economy and other methods of con-
2
trol are better. Or, more directly, does the Navy want a squadron com-
manding officer in Southeast Asia to be concerned with saving money or
destroying the enemy? The answer seems obvious. But the question is
harder when the squadron is not fighting a war. Does the Navy want the
commanding officer to manage the squadron with financial controls; or direct
his energy toward training and readiness of the squadron with little or no em-
phasis on costs ? This is a philosophical question which the Navy has not
answered.
The failure of the Navy to answer this financial management question
has led to some anomalies. Aviation squadrons are accountable for fuel
expenditures while ships are given fuel on an open allotment. But ships buy
2
Vice Admiral Lot Ensley, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logis-
tics), in a speech before the Navy Graduate Financial Management Program
class, The George Washington University, on March 14, 1966.
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most renair parts and housekeeping supplies out of their operating target
while squadrons are provided these items by the station at no cost. And,
within aviation, the Bravo allotment reoresents a very small fraction of the
total cost of operating a squadron (less than 4 per cent in patrol squadrons).
Why hold the commanding officer accountable for Bravo expenses and not the
other costs
At least one current project would remove all dollar accounting
resoonsibility from the ooerating forces. This is the Fleet Logistics Suppo: t
Improvement Program which is designed to move all dollar accounting reco .
from shins (and, by implication, aviation squadrons) to shore -based data-
processing facilities.
The Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Management Program
(abbreviated "3-M") accomplishes part of this objective although it does not
deal with Bravo funds or accounting. This recent Navy program is concerneu
with material support and flight hour reporting only. However, its Mainte-
nance Data Collection System is defined in the 3-M Manual as a Maintenance
3
and Material Management Control and Information System.
Specifically, weapons system costing is accomplished at a central
ADP facility v y combining maintenance source documents for manhours and
material (submitted by the squadron or station maintenance department) and
3
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Management Manual (CNO, OP-43C ",
Ser 839P43, June 4, 1965), p. 1-2.
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the material requisition documents (submitted by station supply) to obtain the
cost. These costs are directly related to weapon (aircraft) systems and the
4
effectiveness of various elements of maintenance organizations. This is a
system, apart from Bravo funding and accounting, which is collecting costs
of aircraft squadrons. But the results are not intended to aid squadron com-
manding officers so much as to provide higher levels of command with factual
information for management decisions.
There is definitely another side to the question of financial manage-
ment in aviation squadrons, however. Many people, schooled in non-military
business methods, feel it is ridiculous for any manager (including a squadron
commanding officer) not to know his personnel costs, maintenance costs,
production costs, and capital expenditures. A first step toward responsibility
is an awareness of costs, and it is important for naval officers to develop
financial responsibility early in their careers. A demonstration of this belief
in the military is the stenciling of original cost on major pieces of equipment.
If we believe in making our enlisted men aware of costs, why do we fail to
provide commanding officers with cost information
One reason commanding officers have not received cost information
is that the Navy simply does not know what the total cost is to operate a ship
or an aircraft squadron. Funding is so segregated by different appropriations,
various bureaus, and separate chains of financial support that it is nearly






responsibility centers, with freedom to decide what costs to incur, and promo-
tion based in part on how well an officer manages costs, does not exist in the
Navy.
The tardiness of the military in adopting business methods of managing
finances was deplored by Dr. Anthony in the article from The Federal Account-
ant quoted at the beginning ox this paper. And, in his ten months as Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Dr. Anthony has worked to design and
implement a management control system. Writing in the January issue of The
Armed Forces Comptroller^ he describes the system:
The system focuses on the manager who has a job to do, and who
uses resources in doing this job. The system should aid and motivate
this manager to do his job as well as possible and to use resources as
efficiently as possible. It should report his accomplishments and his
consumption of resources compared with planned accomplishments and
planned consumption, so that corrective action can be taken as required.
And it should provide information that is useful in making plans and
budgets. . . .
The operating system will be focused on the accomplishments (i. e.
,
outputs) of these responsibility centers and on the resources used by
them (i. e. , costsj^. There will be a budget for each mission unit /i. e. ,
aircraft squadron/, showing the total costs necessary to accomplish its
mission, including the cost of services furnished by service units. . . .
In order to make the transition to such a system three changes are
necessary:
1. The account structure must be revised. This is now in process.
2. There must be a device for including the cost of military per-
sonnel in responsibility centers, while at the same time retaining the
integrity of the Military Personnel appropriations. This device will be
the standard cost.
3. There must be a device for holding costs in suspense between
the time and place of obligation and the time and place of consumption.
This device will be, essentially, a working capital mechanism.
5
Robert N. Anthony, New Frontiers in Defense Financial Manage-
ment, The Federal Accountant, June, 1962, p. 14.
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The advantages of communicating on a single wave length- -costs
structured in terms of organizations and program elements- -instead
of the heterogeneous program, budgeting, and accounting wave lengths,
are obvious. But the system has, I think, more important advantages
than this for management. By focusing on the job to be done and the
total resources used in doing the job, it permits and encourages the
operating manager ... to make better decisions, and gives him more
flexibility in the management of his resources. **
This proposed management control system, which has received the
more acceptable title of Resource Management System, has implications more
far-reaching than any of the Navy programs. It is a Department of Defense
program with the full backing of Secretary McNamara. And, like all of the
Secretary's changes, it will be implemented quickly and completely. The
total cost of new weapons systems has been estimated in cost-effectiveness
studies since 1961. A management device which will provide the total cost
of present weapons systems is long overdue.
Two counter -proposals emerge from these changes. Some programs
are designed to eliminate Bravo allotments and accounting in the squadrons,
other programs are designed to determine total costs of operating a squadron
and to increase accountability of commanding officers. They all have merit,
but seem incompatible. Hopefully, they are not.
The policy of Dr. Anthony is to make the individual commander aware
of, and responsible for, the costs of operating his unit. This does not neces-
sarily mean that the collection and accounting of these costs must be
Robert N. Anthony, 'What's Ahead," The Armed Forces Comptroller,
January, 1966, p. 5.
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accomplished within the unit. In fact, with the expanded use of automatic data
orocessing equipment, this accounting can be more efficiently and accurately
accomplished at central locations.
Specific recommendations involve both the reduction of accounting at
the squadron level and an increase in the financial information orovided to
commanders. First, the system of Bravo allotments, record-keeping, and
reporting should be eliminated at the squadron level. The squadrons would
receive an annual planning figure and quarterly grants in the form of flight
hours rather than dollars. A flight hour requirement for training in each
type of aircraft is the basis for the dollar budget when it is originally devel-
oped by COMNAVAIRJLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC, BUWEPS, and OPNAV.
The number of hours programmed for each squadron is already determined
in developing the dollar budget and it would involve no additional effort to
make the squadron grant in hours rather than dollars.
A principal objection to this proposal may be that it deprives the com-
manding officer of the little flexibility he now has in flight operations. Pres-
ently, he can cease purchasing office supplies or flight clothing and use this
money for additional flight hours. However, this procedure ignores the
increased total cost to the Navy of additional flight hours. The Bravo money
represents less than a tenth of the additional expense for repair parts and
maintenance incurred by flying additional hours. If grants were made to




A more important benefit would accrue from flight hours instead of
dollar grants. The focus would change from spending (or saving) money to
using (or conserving) flight hours. The ultimate purpose of dollar expendi-
tures is to achieve a high state of combat readiness. This is obtained by
flight hours expended in useful training. Although a squadron commanding
officer could admittedly waste flight hours just as surely as he might waste
money, the emphasis on flight hours would hopefully urge him to use his
allotted flight hours efficiently. And he can continue to be encouraged to
operate efficiently from a monetary standpoint, as will be explained later.
With no allotment, the necessity of accounting in the squadron would
be eliminated. Formal accounting is now accomplished at the two Fleet Avia-
tion Accounting Offices and this satisfies all legal requirements. The require
ment on the squadron to forward copies of requisition documents could also
be eliminated. The squadron presently transmits to the Fleet Aviation
Accounting Office documents representing a charge against the Bravo allot-
ment (called NSA charges as they buy parts from the Navy Stock Accounts).
But the squadron does not transmit documents or maintain records or report
any expenditures made against the Appropriations Purchase Account (APA
charges). Station supply departments currently transmit both NSA charge
documents and APA charge documents and these documents alone can be used
to effect the formal accounting necessary.
Arguments which support the existence of two systems with different
requirements for reporting and varying degrees of control are indicative of
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the short-range outlook of present methods which hold a commanding officer
more accountable for relatively small NSA expenditures than for large APA
expenditures. The anomaly of these dual systems is evident, considering the
common source of the money, the taxpayer to whom the Navy is ultimately
responsible.
The squadrons would still be required to transmit documents of pur-
chases at commercial or foreign government fields. This is necessary as
the supplier copies of these documents require months to be processed
between governments and the money must be obligated. These represent a
very small percentage of the purchases of most squadrons.
Monetary reporting by the squadron would cease to be necessary and
the NSA cost information needed for financial decisions could be provided by
the Fleet Aviation Accounting Offices. APA charges for maintenance parts
will be collected through the Standard Navy Material and Maintenance Manage-
ment Program as it is currently being implemented. Expenses of military
personnel and services provided by other units will be provided by the
Resource Management System which is now being put into effect. Through
these three systems the total costs of operating a squadron will be available.
It is important that this information be combined and presented in a form that
will facilitate decision making.
It is equally important that this total cost information be distributed
not only to COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRPAC, CNO, and BUWEPS, but
to the squadrons as well. One advantage of squadron distribution is the
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opportunity for the commanding officer and other interested officers to audit
the accuracy of the information. This principle is now being used in the new
Aircraft Accounting System. Information on aircraft flight time is being sub-
mitted electronically by the squadrons after each flight instead of mailing a
monthly report. But the squadrons receive a machine tabulation of the infor-
mation at the end of each month for accuracy verification. A similar system
is proposed for squadron expenses, with the individual documents processed
by the station supply department and the Fleet Aviation Accounting Office
serving as the inputs and the squadrons receiving a machine tabulation at the
end of each month. The individual squadrons are in the best position to know
if unusual expenses are correct and to recognize trends.
The ability of a commanding officer to take action based on the finan-
cial reports he receives would depend upon policies of higher commands. As
more effective financial information is generated throughout the Navy, a
greater reliance on financial control may evolve. Two factors are necessary:
giving squadron commanding officers a greater choice of resources to accom-
plish a mission; and an increased requirement on officers to be good financial
managers, including a greater indication of their abilities in this area on fit-
ness reports.
The idea of giving commanding officers wide latitude in resources
available to accomplish a mission is anathema to some senior Navy officers.
They rebel at the thought of a squadron commander being able to trade several
men for more Bravo money or some labor-saving equipment. This has led
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most commanding officers to consider manpower a fixed cost or, even
worse, not a cost at all as the men are in the squadron even if the com-
mander does not need them. In practice, commanders almost universally
plead for more men instead of searching for ways to cut manpower require-
ments as is common in private business.
The idea that manpower is not a cost pervades other areas where the
commanding officer does not have a choice of what resources he can use and
cannot make trade-offs between resources. With a management system that
provides an accurate measurement of the total cost of operating a squadron,
commanders should be given more opportunity to reduce the total cost by a
judicious balance of all resources to obtain the best results. The ability to
make trade-offs at the operational level and increase management ability is
7
an objective of the DOD Resource Management System.
The present lack of emphasis on financial responsibility of junior
officers in the Navy was obvious in comments on the questionnaires, in regu-
lar reports of wasteful expenditures in aviation squadrons throughout the
Navy, and in selection of officers for commanding officer billets whose con-
cept of financial management is to use up all the operating target so that the
squadron will receive the full allotment next quarter. High-ranking officers
in the Navy firmly believe in financial responsibility, but this feeling does
not pervade the lower ranks. A new system with better financial information
7
Rear Admiral M. A. Hirsch, Deputy Comptroller of the Navy, in a




will not change attitudes. But it will provide financial information to com-
manders at all levels. Commanders must provide the strong leadership
which, combined with factual information, can make financial responsibility
a vital part of the entire Navy.

CHAPTER VII
THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
This report has dealt almost entirely with measuring the costs of
operating an aircraft squadron with slight consideration of the results obtained.
Although intentional, this approach evades the principal difference between
military and commercial activities. While financial records and reports pro-
vide a fairly complete indication of results (profits) in civilian endeavors, an
entirely separate method is necessary to measure results in military activi-
ties.
An attempt to measure both costs and results with a financial tool is
the calculation of average cost per flight hour. But this indicates results only
vaguely. Flight hours may represent a bombing mission over North Vietnam,
training for a new pilot, or a pleasant trip to a pilot's home town. Obviously,
these do not all have the same benefit to the nation or indicate equal results.
A more intricate measure than flight hours is needed to indicate the value
received for money spent.
Results are commonly measured in a squadron by the term "readi-
ness. This is a percentage evaluation of a squadron's effectiveness or abil-
ity to accomplish its mission. It is a measurement infinitely more difficult
and less precise than the determination of costs. Readiness is assessed pri-




readiness inspection, the annual administrative material inspection, the
availability of mission-ready aircraft throughout the year, and the ability of
individual pilots or crews as measured by the training completed. A detailed
analysis of the concept of readiness is beyond the scope of this paper, but
two points will be discussed. This is the relationship of costs to training
and costs to readiness.
y
The measurement of training accomplished can be fairly precise.
Records of squadron training are maintained for each pilot and flight crew.
Squadrons also report to higher commands the number of flight hours of
training accomplished. A valid comparison could be obtained by dividing the
direct cost of a flight (fuel, oil, manpower, ordnance) by the hours of spe-
cific training accomplished. These direct costs could be accumulated by
entering the gallons of fuel and oil used, the type and quantity of ordnance
expended, and the rank or rate and time involved of personnel directly con-
cerned with the flight on the data card used to transmit flight and aircraft
information to the aircraft accounting system. The computer can be pro-
grammed to translate this information into dollars (using the standard rates
by pay grade of the Resource Management System for personnel costing).
Within a squadron, the commanding officer can use these costs to
measure the cost effectiveness of different types of training. Although this
would be a crude tool at the squadron level, it would be an improvement over
the current situation where the commander has no information regarding the
cost per hour of various training. Although operational requirements dictate
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the minimum training necessary, additional training could be scheduled to
obtain the maximum training for the dollar. If $1, 000 purchased twenty hours
of landing practice or thirty hours of instrument flight training, the com-
mander might want to choose the instrument training. Without knowledge of
the costs involved in specific training, he could not make a rational choice.
Relating costs to training at the squadron level is a logical extension
of budgetary procedures that relate money requests to minimum pilot train-
ing requirements. The training officer in a squadron should make full use of
cost information supplied by the material control officer to recommend the
most effective training schedule.
Relating training to costs is effective as they both can be measured
easily and accurately. However, training is only a part of readiness. Readi-
ness is a result of training but it is not directly related as training may or
may not be productive. Readiness exercises and other devices measure not
only how much training has been accomplished, but how good it has been.
Although difficult to measure, values of readiness are determined both within
the squadron and for the squadron as a unit.
The measurement of readiness does provide an indication of results
that financial records cannot provide in the military. Unfortunately, costs
are totally excluded when measuring readiness and little attempt is made to
relate the two later. Cost and readiness must be examined together to deter-
mine the cost effectiveness of pilots, crews, aircraft, and squadrons. The
total cost for an individual pilot or crew to achieve a certain level of

74
readiness would provide an excellent standard for comparison. Again, this
would require the accumulation of costs for each flight to assign costs to indi-
vidual pilots or crews. These costs could be divided by the percentage of
readiness to obtain a cost of readiness. Knowing the cost of readiness for
individual pilots and crews, the commander can exercise the control neces-
sary to achieve a high state of readiness at minimum cost for the squadron.
Crews utilising resources fully to achieve readiness can be congratulated;
crews with a high cost of readiness can be prodded to use their resources
more productively. This alone would make every pilot and crew member
more cost-conscious than any 'economy drive. "
Comparisons among squadrons flying the same model of aircraft can
be made with the cost and readiness information presently available. Total
Bravo costs of a squadron during its training cycle between deployments can
be compared with the readiness level the squadron achieves. As other costs
become available, these can be added to obtain a total cost of readiness for
each squadron.
This is a very brief explanation of several ways cost information can
provide improved control to the commander. The collection of ail pertinent
costs should be intensely investigated and a complete paper could be written
on determining the costs of each element, such as spare parts, utilities,
training of pilots, crew members, and maintenance personnel, flight safety,
caoital investment, and salaries. Other studies are necessary to provide
improved measures of readiness or effectiveness of aircraft squadrons.

75
And detailed procedures for assessing costs in relation to readiness must be
developed.
The increased use of good financial information advocated in this
paper will mean improved control for Navy commanders. It will not increase
their command power based on the authority of rank or ability. Command
ability is extremely important to the Navy, but often management ability is
equally vital. Management, or control, introduces the ideas of efficiency
and a standard of comparison for measuring results.
Financial management is an essential part of control. Almost all the
decisions made by the Secretary of Defense are control, not command,
decisions that consider the cost as well as the effectiveness of a proposal.
The Navy must also exercise control throughout the fleet. Control can be
effective only when it is based on standards developed with accurate financial
information. The return to the Navy will be increased effectiveness and





TO MATERIAL OFFICERS OF NAVY AVIATION SQUADRONS:
Your current instructions on expenditure and accounting of aircraft
operating funds or "Bravo Money" have been designed to provide
information to OpNav and the major commands „ These instructions
provide '.or transmitting total data on past expenditures 30 decisions
can be made at high levels concerning current finding requirements-
At the squadron level, where the money is actually spent, past total
data is not sufficient information to assess squadron Bravo Money
requirements , Detailed past expenditures and future predictions are
necessary for intelligent financial management.,
As part of my course work at the Navy Graduate Financial Management
Program at George Washington University, I am designing a system
for managing Bravo Funds that will primarily aid the squadron* This
system will be based on applicable instructions issued by CNO and
major commands and interviews with officers who administer the Navy
flight hour program and tabulate the Op- 501 reports. Principally, the
system will be based on the needs of aviation squadrons as expressed
in answers to the enclosed questionnaire.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine squadron practices
and to provide a forum for presenting improvements. The value of
this study will be greatly increased if respondents provides
1„ A candid answer to every question
2. Promp consideration.
The results ox the questionnaire will be strictly anonymous. It is
designed to be answered in a few minutes. Your response is necessary




I. Internal Bravo Fund Reporting
1. Do you maintain a money-time graph in the material office?
yes^ no In the commanding officer's office? yes no
2. Is a detailed form used to report the status of Bravo Funds
internally? yes no „
3« If a detailed form is used internally,, who receives copies?
CO_^ XO
_ Operations Maintenance ^Maintenance Control
Other
______
4. If a money-time graph or detailed form is used, is it revised
weekly? monthly? when the OP -501 is prepared ? •
5. Is the money remaining expressed in dollars ? flight
hours ? both ?
6. Is the commanding officer informed of the current cost per hour
weekly? when the OP-501 is prepared? ^monthly?
quarterly? not at all? .
7. If the cost per hour is computed, is it broken down into avgas,
avlube, and other costs? yes no
.
8o Does your commanding officer require a breakdown of "other"
costs into flight equipments hand tools, office supplies, etc* ? yes
no
9. Is the method of reporting Bravo expenditures to your commanding
officer closely related to OP-501, OpTar, and other external reports?
yes no
10. How much unobligated money do you strive to have at the end of a
quarter ? 0_ $ 1 00__ $200__ J$500__ jnor e_ ( specify). At the
end of the fiscal year"? $ 100 $200
~" $500 more J specify
11. If answer to question 10 is less than $100, are stubs actually typed
or is money only obligated on the books ? Stubs typed Not typed

II. Squadron Interest in Bravo Expenditures
1. How many times has the subject of reduced aircraft operating costs









Maintenance Officer Material Officer^
Other (Indicate number of times each spoke on cost reduction.
)
3. Would you describe your commanding officer's interest in Bravo
expenditures as slight? moderate great .
4. Does your aircraft maintenance officer understand the Bravo fund
accounting and reporting procedures? yes no
III. Forms Used for Internal Reporting
1. Many squadrons have devised special forms for internal Bravo
reporting. If you use a Squadron or Comfair designed form, please enclose
a copy and explain how it is filled out and used.
2. What do you feel is the principal method used to inform your com-
manding officer of Bravo expenditures and balance? (Place a figure 1 next
to the most important and continue numbering the others in order of impor-










Transmittals to Fleet Accounting Office ^
3. The OP-501 report is currently machine -tabulated monthly at the
Pentagon. For each squadron the programmed hours, actual hours, pro-
grammed money, actual money, programmed cost per hour, actual cost per
hour, and utility (hours per crew per month) are computed and this informa-
tion is sent to Air Pac, Air L»ant, and used in OpNav for management and
justification of funds. Do you feel it would be worth the cost and effort to
send each squadron the information concerning its progress? yes_ no
Would you like to have this information on sister squadrons for comparison ?
ye 8 no
4. If the complete Bravo record-keeping and reporting system were
changed, what additional or better information would you desire to aid you




Note: The results of several questions were not included in the text;
these questions and results are:







Officer, Flight Officer) 5
11-4. Does your aircraft maintenance officer understand the Bravo fund
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From? Material Officer
To: Officer in Charge
Subjs Report of Bravo Allotment and Cost Analysis
1» As of 6 5 0? thin date, the status of Bravo expenditures and
f.h© analysis of current cost are as follows:
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(^) Balance available for operations
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Suggestions f°r improvement of Bravo procedures received in reply-
to squadron questionnaires:
1. International credit card vice flight packet for purchases away
from home base.
2. A single report to central point with distribution instead of multi-
ple reports from squadron.
3. OPNAV 3710-2 and OPNAV 3710-1 involves duplication for squad-
rons operating only one type of aircraft.
4. Training safety is more important than Bravo economy.
5. Squadrons have no flexibility in Bravo expenditures.
6. Provide a detailed listing of what constitutes correct Bravo charges.
7. Squadron must know quarterly OPTAR to request additional funds;
late OPTAR grants hinder effective planning.
3. Provide cost per hour divided into shipboard and shore-based
operations.
9. Eliminate squadron Bravo funding, record keeping, and reporting.
10. Disseminate specific operating methods of low-cost squadrons.
11. Eliminate unmatched expenditures for less than $100; waste of
time and proves little.
12. Provide more concrete guidelines for preparing flight packets.
13. Economy measures by material officer are fruitless in a squad-
ron where the commanding officer is intent on burning up every penny.
14. Distribution of cost -per -hour information among squadrons flying
the same type of aircraft would stimulate cost reduction.
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